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I.  INTRODUCTION 
My favorite bit of folk wisdom is “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 
However, when considering the ongoing revisions to the Model Penal 
Code: Sentencing (MPCS) provisions, a corollary comes to mind: “fix 
what’s really broke, and don’t risk breaking what ain’t really broke.” 
Unfortunately, the MPCS revisions fail to address what is really broken in 
modern American sentencing systems, and they overlook enduring (and 
still timely) wisdom found in the original MPCS. Thus, I view the MPCS 
revision as at best, a missed opportunity; at worst, the codification of 
problematic modern sentencing dynamics. 
The MPCS revision starts with the premise that the original MPCS 
provisions are broken. The Reporter’s Introduction states that although the 
original MPCS provisions “were a vast improvement over pre-existing 
American Law, they were built on assumptions that have fallen into 
uncertainty or disfavor.”1 Stressing the “weakening of rehabilitation as the 
general justificatory aim of punishment” and modern structures designed to 
regulate and regularize discretionary sentencing decisions, the MPCS 
revision asserts that “the architecture of the 1962 Code’s sentencing 
provisions no longer fits current realities.”2 
As a descriptive matter, the original MPCS is dated by its endorsement 
of judges and parole officials having broad discretionary authority to tailor 
sentences to each individual offender’s unique rehabilitative needs. But, as 
a normative matter, it is not obvious that either the theoretical 
                                                                                                                     
 * William B. Saxbe Designated Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law. 
 1. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 2. Id. 
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commitments or the structural architecture of the original MPCS is dated or 
broken. Indeed, because the current realities of mass imprisonment and 
sentencing severity are the real problems with modern systems, the 
American Law Institute (ALI) should focus on refreshing some of the 
wisest aspects of the original MPCS. 
Not only does the MPCS revision fail to champion some enduring 
wisdom to be found in the original MPCS, it also fails to address 
effectively the structural and social forces that have fueled the severity 
revolution that now defines most modern sentencing and punishment 
schemes. Indeed, I fear the MPCS revision risks legitimating and reifying 
the social, political, and legal forces that have helped make the United 
States the world’s leader in incarceration and other extreme punishments. 
Rather than seeking to codify what might seem like best practices of 
modern reforms that are leading us in the wrong direction, the ALI should 
be speaking out forcefully about modern injustices and should be using its 
prestige and authority to try to radically redirect the United States’ 
sentencing attitudes and practices. 
II.   WHAT’S TRULY BROKEN IN MODERN PUNISHMENT AND 
SENTENCING 
The Reporter’s Introduction to the revised sentencing provisions 
acknowledges the “near quintupling of the incarceration rate from 1970 to 
2005” and also “the unprecedented growth in sentenced populations 
through the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s.”3 But there is no explicit 
statement or even implicit acknowledgment in the MPCS revision that the 
extraordinary modern growth in the American imprisonment rates is 
conceptually problematic in a nation “conceived in Liberty.”4 Nor does the 
revision grapple with the fact that mass incarceration is so practically 
problematic due to the extreme economic and social costs imposed on 
offender populations and society as a whole. 
As I have noted in an earlier work,5 although wrongful convictions and 
the death penalty regularly capture the attention of academics and the 
media, America’s modern affinity for locking people in cages has yet to 
become a regular aspect of political, scholarly, or public dialogues. 
Although a few academics and public policy groups are starting to examine 
the causes and consequences of modern mass incarceration with increased 
urgency,6 neither the scope nor the dire nature of the mass incarceration 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. at xxvii, xxix. 
 4. See Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 
1863), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/gadd/images/Gettysburg-2.jpg. 
 5. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Extreme Punishment, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE 
OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 163, 163 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009). 
 6. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1 (2006); MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE TO 
INCARCERATE 1 (1999); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY  IN AMERICA xi (2007); see 
also THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, ONE IN 100: BEHIND 
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problem in the United States has garnered sufficient attention. 
An accounting of a few basic statistics highlights why mass 
incarceration and extreme prison punishments are the most pressing 
modern sentencing problems in the United States.7 A recent report from the 
Vera Institute of Justice provides this quantification of America’s growing 
eagerness for locking up its populace: 
Between 1970 and 2005, state and federal authorities 
increased prison populations by 628 percent. By 2005, more 
than 1.5 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on 
any given day, and an additional 750,000 were incarcerated in 
local jails. By the turn of the 21st century, more than 5.6 
million living Americans had spent time in a state or federal 
prison—nearly 3 percent of the U.S. population.8 
Disconcertingly, these increases in prison populations seem unlikely to 
reverse course anytime soon as the overall population of incarcerated 
individuals nationwide hits record highs each year,9 nd sophisticated 
projections suggest these numbers are likely to continue upward.10 
When placed in a global perspective, the unprecedented growth in 
American imprisonment is especially stunning. A far higher proportion of 
adults is imprisoned in the United States than in any other country in the 
entire world.11 Our incarceration rate, which is nearly 750 individuals per 
100,000 in the population, is now roughly five to ten times the rate of most 
other Western industrialized nations.12 Indeed, our prison population and 
incarceration rates surpass even those of countries that have long been 
viewed as particularly disrespectful of human rights: 
 
                                                                                                                     
BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008) [hereinafter PEW CENTER, ONE IN 100], available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/sentencing_and_corrections/ 
one_in_100.pdf (discussing incarceration levels in the United States). 
 7. Indeed, given the racial, social, and economic inequalities reflected in and reinforced by 
modern incarceration patterns, mass incarceration and extreme prison punishments are now the 
nation’s most pressing modern civil rights problems. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2009). 
 8. HEATHER C. WEST &  WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS: PRISONERS IN 2007, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p 
07.pdf. 
 9. See LAUREN E. GLAZE &  THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS: PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus07st.pdf. 
 10. THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PUBLIC SAFETY, 
PUBLIC SPENDING: FORECASTING AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 2007–2011, at 1 (2007), available 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/State-based_policy/PSPP_ 
prison_projections_0207.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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The U.S. imprisons significantly more people than any other 
nation. China ranks second, imprisoning 1.5 million of its 
much larger citizen population. The U.S. also leads the world 
in incarceration rates, well above Russia and Cuba, which 
have the next highest rates of 607 and 487 per 100,000. 
Western European countries have incarceration rates that 
range from 78 to 145 per 100,000.13 
While these statistics reveal the basic dimensions of modern mass 
incarceration in the United States, drilling deeper into the numbers 
provides an even more disconcerting snapshot of America’s affinity for 
extreme imprisonment terms. For example, a study by The Sentencing 
Project documents an extraordinary growth in offenders serving life terms: 
The 127,677 lifers in prison [as of 2003] represent an increase 
of 83% from the number of lifers nationally in 1992, which in 
turn had doubled since 1984. During the 1990s the growth of 
persons serving life without parole has been even more 
precipitous, an increase of 170%, between 1992 and 2003. 
Overall, one of every six lifers in 1992 was serving a sentence 
of life without parole. By 2003, that proportion had increased 
to one in four. 
Moreover, the number of long-term prisoners is 
considerably greater than just the total number of lifers and 
contributes to the population of what can be considered 
“virtual lifers”–persons serving very long sentences or 
consecutive sentences that often outlast the person’s natural 
life. One 2000 study estimated that more than one of every 
four (27.5%) adult prisoners was serving a sentence of twenty 
years or more. Further, data from the Department of Justice 
show that as of 2002, state and federal prisons held 121,000 
persons aged fifty or over, more than double the figure of a 
decade earlier.14 
These sobering statistics indicate that there are now more individuals 
nearly certain to die in American prisons than there were in the total United 
States’ prison population at the time the original MPCS provisions were 
developed. Furthermore, female offenders, non-violent drug offenders, and 
mentally ill offenders have now become a significant portion of the 
population sentenced to life terms.15 Moreover, as another recent report 
documents, American jurisdictions are uniquely willing to sentence even 
juvenile offenders to life without the possibility of parole: 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. 
 14. MARC MAUER ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE MEANING OF “L IFE”:  LONG PRISON 
SENTENCES IN CONTEXT 11 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 1. 
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/3
2009] THE ORIGINAL MPC SENTENCING PROVISIONS 713 
 
[T]here are currently at least 2,225 people incarcerated in the 
United States who have been sentenced to spend the rest of 
their lives in prison for crimes they committed as 
children . . . . Before 1980, life without parole was rarely 
imposed on children. . . . 
 
Virtually all countries in the world reject the punishment of 
life without parole for child offenders. At least 132 countries 
reject life without parole for child offenders in domestic law 
or practice. And all countries except the United States and 
Somalia have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which explicitly forbids “life imprisonment without 
possibility of release” for “offenses committed by persons 
below eighteen years of age.” Of the 154 countries for which 
Human Rights Watch was able to obtain data, only three 
currently have people serving life without parole for crimes 
they committed as children, and it appears that those three 
countries combined have only about a dozen such cases.16 
Though not quite as dramatic and life-defining as incarceration, novel 
and highly consequential forms of liberty deprivation in the United States 
are an aspect of daily life for millions more American citizens now 
confined to prison or jail cells. Currently, well over five million persons 
are serving probation, parole, or some other form of post-release 
supervision,17 and certain classes of offenders have become modern 
pariahs subject to new types of extreme social control. For example, 
hundreds of thousands of sex offenders not only must register their 
movements with authorities, but are literally banished from living or even 
coming near many regions of the country.18 
Finally, beyond the extremely large number of persons formally subject 
to criminal justice control in the United States, former offenders in 
virtually every American jurisdiction suffer a range of punitive collateral 
consequences that serve as a persistent sort of shadow imprisonment. As 
one recent report explains:  
In every U.S. jurisdiction, the legal system erects formidable 
barriers to the reintegration of criminal offenders into free 
society. When a person is convicted of a crime, that person 
                                                                                                                     
 16. AMNESTY INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 2, 5 (2005), available at http://www.amnesty 
usa.org/countries/usa/clwop/report.pdf. 
 17. See GLAZE &  BONCZAR, supra note 9, at 1.  
 18. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on 
Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L.R. 101, 103–04 (2007); see also Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional 
Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (discussing 
the political appeal of exclusion laws and the likelihood that they will be applied to other ex-
offender subpopulations in the future). 
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becomes subject to a host of legal disabilities and penalties 
under state and federal law. These so-called collateral 
consequences of conviction may continue long after the court-
imposed sentence has been fully served . . . [and] a criminal 
record can be grounds for exclusion from many benefits and 
opportunities, including employment in education, health 
care, and transportation. . . . These legal barriers are always 
difficult and often impossible to overcome, so that persons 
convicted of a crime can expect to carry the collateral 
disabilities and stigma of conviction to their grave, no matter 
how successful their efforts to rehabilitate themselves.19 
This brief review of various facets of modern mass incarceration and 
extreme social control in the United States only begins to document what is 
most badly broken in America’s current punishment and sentencing 
schemes. But this summary overview highlights why I question the notion 
that the original MPCS’ theories and structures are what need to be fixed. 
In my view, the stunning expansion of United States imprisonment rates 
and other extreme punishments, along with the costs and consequences of 
mass incarceration and other forms of government deprivations of liberty, 
should be the preeminent concern for anyone assessing the theories and 
structures of modern sentencing systems. Moreover, as explained in the 
next Part, the theoretical underpinnings and social consequences of 
structured sentencing reforms embraced by the MPCS revision may further 
contribute to America’s modern affinity for locking more and more people 
behind bars. 
III.   AS A MATTER OF THEORY, THE MPCS REVISION BREAKS 
WHAT DOESN’T NEED FIXING  
As mentioned above, the MPCS revision rightly notes that the original 
MPCS provisions “were built on assumptions that have fallen into 
uncertainty or disfavor.”20 But the MPCS revision neglects to highlight that 
the “assumptions” of the rehabilitative model of sentencing and corrections 
in the original MPCS were fundamentally progressive. They reflected an 
ultimate commitment that governments should focus the state’s awesome 
and coercive power at sentencing on helping offenders become law-abiding 
citizens through rehabilitative programming. Further, the MPCS revision 
fails to acknowledge, and perhaps even fails to recognize, that these 
“assumptions” may have played an important role, at least indirectly, in 
preventing the extreme increases in prison populations and liberty 
                                                                                                                     
 19. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE ix–x (2006). 
 20. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxviii 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
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deprivations that have come to characterize modern American sentencing 
and punishment systems. 
A complicated set of political and social factors have contributed to 
modern mass incarceration;21 new attitudes and prevailing sentencing 
theories are only part of this story. Still, it is unlikely coincidental that 
incarceration rates have increased dramatically and punishments have 
become much harsher during the same era in which the progressive 
“assumptions” of rehabilitative theory have been eschewed. Moreover, the 
MPCS revision essentially seeks to put the final nail in the coffin of the 
rehabilitative ideal by formally embracing the theory of “limiting 
retributivism” as the best and dominant philosophy for modern sentencing 
systems.22 With its embrace of limiting retributivism, the MPCS revision 
never confronts or even directly considers the possibility that the 
movement away from rehabilitative commitments in modern sentencing 
reforms have been a critical catalyst for forces contributing to modern mass 
incarceration.  
Though other contributors to this symposium provide a more thorough 
critique of “limiting retributivism” in the MPCS revision,23 it is useful here 
to briefly review the progressive origins of the rehabilitative ideal and the 
progressive origins of its modern decline. In the nineteenth century, 
progressives pioneered a move away from brutal physical punishments 
toward the development of penitentiaries focused on the spiritual 
rehabilitation of lawbreakers.24 And in the twentieth century, progressives 
looked to advances in medicine and psychology to reinforce their 
sympathetic view of criminal offenders as “sick” and their humanistic 
commitment to sentencing schemes that employed the government’s 
coercive power to help “cure” the patient.25 
But progressives discovered that sentencing and corrections systems did 
not in operation live up to society’s purportedly humane commitments, and 
                                                                                                                     
 21. See generally GOTTSCHALK, supra note 6 (detailing the array of forces leading to 
incarceration increases); KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY : LAW AND ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS (1999) (same); MAUER, supra note 6, at 15–99 (same). 
 22. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxx 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); Id. §1.02(2) & cmts. and ills., at 1-8;  Id. § 1.02(2), Reporter’s 
Note, at 24-32.   
 23. See Michael H. Marcus, MPC—The Root of the Problem: Just Deserts and Risk 
Assessment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 751 (2009); Alice Ristroph, How (Not) to Think Like a Punisher, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 727 (2009). 
 24. See generally David J. Rothman, Perfecting the Prison: United States, 1789-1865, in THE 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 100, 111 
(Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998) [hereinafter OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON] 
(discussing the origins and development of prison systems and their commitment to the 
rehabilitative ideal). 
 25. See generally Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865-1965, in 
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 24, at 171, 188–96 (discussing the “new rehabilitative 
thrust” in which enthusiasm for psychological treatment led to a new emphasis on a “therapeutic 
model of rehabilitation”). 
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they complained about the failure to devote sufficient resources to effective 
corrections programming and about the tendency of rehabilitative ideals to 
be corrupted in practice.26 In the 1960s and 1970s, especially as lawyers, 
politicians, and activists became increasingly suspect about the efficacy of 
rehabilitative efforts and increasingly concerned about individual rights 
and equality of treatment in the criminal justice system, the paternalistic 
and more pernicious facets of the rehabilitative model of sentencing and 
corrections came under attack.27 Criminal justice researchers and scholars 
began criticizing the unpredictable and disparate sentencing outcomes that 
are inevitable when discretionary sentencing decisions are focused on 
offender rehabilitation; structured sentencing regimes promising more 
predictable and consistent punishments became more appealing to 
academics and policymakers.28 And, during the early calls for repudiation 
of the rehabilitative ideal and for increased focus on consistent sentencing 
outcomes, many sentencing reformers suggested that a shift in sentencing 
purposes and structures would result in an overall reduction of sentence 
severity.29  
But noble goals rarely ensure idealized outcomes, especially in the 
administration of criminal justice systems. As jurisdictions abolished or 
greatly limited discretionary parole opportunities and created structured 
rules for sentencing decision-making, no cogent or even fully-conceived 
sentencing theory filled the vacuum that followed the rejection of the 
rehabilitative ideal. Practically speaking, much of the modern sentencing 
reform movement came to function as an anti-movement. Jurisdictions 
adopted structured sentencing laws and abolished parole not in an express 
pursuit of a new sentencing theory, but rather just as a rejection of the 
rehabilitative ideal.30 Though some often sought to justify longer prison 
sentences with claims about deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution, the 
only clear and consistently tangible goals of many sentencing reforms were 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See generally id. at 169 (discussing the international rehabilitative emphasis in prisons); 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 8–9 (1971) (arguing that 
rehabilitative programs in American prisons have largely failed). 
 27. Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. &  CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895–97 (1990). 
 28. See generally id. (tracing the restructuring process that led to the restriction on judicial 
discretion in sentencing laws); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 
272–74 (1977) (arguing that judicial discretion causes disparity in sentencing but that fixed 
sentencing will not solve all the disparity problems). 
 29. See generally FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING 3 (1976); DAVID FOGEL, “. . . WE ARE THE LIVING 
PROOF . . .”: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 2 (1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: 
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 4 (1976). 
 30. See Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 11–13 
(discussing how the modern sentencing revolution has been theoretically underdeveloped); see also 
Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 279 (2005) (“The federal 
guidelines have been demonstrably purpose-free.”). 
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the repudiation of rehabilitation as the dominant theory of punishment and 
the reduction of sentencing disparities that resulted from discretionary 
sentencing practices.31 
Despite the absence of any dominant, clear new sentencing theory, 
modern reforms have gravitated toward one dominant, clear new 
sentencing outcome: legislators, prosecutors, and judges have all regularly 
and readily embraced terms of imprisonment as a default punishment.32 
Unlike various punishment alternatives that might seem inconsistent with 
certain sentencing theories, imprisonment has the ready appeal of always 
being defensible in service to retributivism, incapacitation, or deterrence 
and has the added convenience of being distributable in the readily 
quantifiable units of months and years.33 In other words, even when 
legislators, prosecutors, and judges were unsure about what exact purpose 
punishment should serve, imprisonment terms had the virtue of always 
seeming to serve some purpose. Moreover, prison punishments could be 
distributed and compared in defined quantums so that those focused on 
sentencing disparities could numerically assess whether seemingly similar 
offenders were receiving similar sentences.  
Stated slightly differently, despite (or perhaps because of) the absence 
of an effective and informative guiding theory for modern sentencing 
structures, jurisdictions reforming their sentencing systems have generally 
recast the concepts, culture, and structure of sentencing decision-making 
toward actors and factors that foster an imprisonment-first orientation and 
more punitive sentencing impulses. Modern sentencing regimes have 
principally shifted excessive power to ex ante sentencing rule-makers, like 
legislatures and commissions, who necessarily focus on the perceived harm 
of general offenses and who necessarily respond more to concerns about 
crime rates being too high or particular sentences seeming too lenient.34 
Further, the emphasis placed on the goal of sentencing uniformity has 
profoundly diminished the authority or desire of ex post sentencing 
decision-makers, such as prosecutors, judges, and parole officials, to focus 
on the redeeming (often disparate) personal qualities of individual 
offenders. 
                                                                                                                     
 31. See Berman, supra note 30, at 11–13. 
 32. See, e.g., MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING PRISONS: HOW TO REDUCE CRIME AND END 
MASS INCARCERATION (2005); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &  GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995) (highlighting the reliance on imprisonment in 
penal policy). 
 33. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 391 (1995) (stressing forces leading to undue reliance on imprisonment as opposed to 
other forms of punishment). 
 34. See Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. POL’Y REV. 93 (1999); Ronald F. 
Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW &  POL’Y 429, 
437 (1998). 
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Specifically, in nearly all jurisdictions throughout the United States, 
legislatures and sentencing commissions came to embrace and enact 
mandatory imprisonment terms for certain offenses and more severe and 
rigid sentencing rules based on enhanced concerns about consistently 
imposing “just punishment” and deterring the most harmful crimes.35 
Particularly because legislatures and sentencing commissions make 
decisions about crime and punishment ex ante, they necessarily think of 
criminal offenders as abstract characters—the threatening figure of a killer 
or sex offender or drug dealer—rather than as individuals. With a focus on 
the most abstract horrors of criminal activity and the most vile versions of 
criminal offenders, these ex ante sentencing judgments will always tend to 
be more punitive in response to any real or perceived “crime problem.” 
Moreover, most structured sentencing reforms have tended to formally 
mandate (or at least informally encourage) prosecutors and sentencing 
judges to focus principally on offense conduct.36 The move away from an 
offender orientation was driven by understandable concerns about the 
tendency for prosecutors and judges to show disproportionate leniency 
toward favored individuals; in effect, this move has often operated to limit 
judges’ ability to consider those aspects of a defendant’s life and 
characteristics that have historically been thought to justify mitigating the 
need for a harsh response to an offense.37 
These modern sentencing dynamics have been on special display in the 
federal criminal justice system over the last two decades. The United States 
Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have 
excessively focused attention on aggravating offense conduct and have 
limited judges’ opportunities to consider mitigating offender 
characteristics.38 Mandatory sentencing provisions and enhancement are 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 280–83 (2005). 
 36. See id. at 280–85. 
 37. See Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) (lamenting that federal reforms had drained 
sentencing of its humanity); John M. Walker, Jr., Loosening the Administrative Handcuffs: 
Discretion and Responsibility Under the Guidelines, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 551, 551–52 (1993) 
(discussing judicial complaints that federal sentencing reforms “have eliminated the human element 
from the sentencing process”). 
 38. Tellingly, the first four steps in the sentencing process described in the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual are concerned exclusively with offense conduct. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements § 1B1.1 [hereinafter U.S.S.G.]. Other provisions 
declare that many potentially mitigating offender characteristics—such as a defendant’s education 
and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, previous employment record, and family 
and community ties—are either “not ordinarily relevant” or entirely irrelevant to whether a 
defendant should receive a departure below the guideline sentencing range. See, g., U.S.S.G. 
§§ 5H1.1–1.6 (providing that age, education and vocational skills, mental and emotional conditions, 
physical condition, previous employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community 
ties are “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the 
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triggered typically by quantifiable offense factors—e.g., a longer prison 
term for certain drug quantities or certain monetary loss amounts or 
possession of a firearm. These provisions necessarily diminish the 
significance of less quantifiable offender characteristics in federal 
sentencing.  
Consequently, while important and largely progressive goals initially 
fueled modern reforms in state and federal sentencing systems, emphasis 
on the goal of sentencing uniformity has fueled a “leveling up” dynamic. In 
most efforts to make sentences more uniform, new sentencing structures, 
legal doctrines, and policy decisions have resulted frequently in legislatures 
and sentencing commissions making disparately lenient sentences 
consistently harsher, and have rarely encouraged or even allowed 
prosecutors or judges to make disparately harsh sentences more 
consistently lenient.  
Of course, the MPCS revision does aspire to replace the rehabilitative 
ideal reflected in the original MPCS with a modern theory of “limiting 
retributivism.” However, as punishment theorists justifiably have 
complained, this hybrid theory does not have all that much tangible content 
to shape either ex ante or ex post sentencing judgments.39 The theory thus 
seems unlikely to play a significant role in retarding the structural and 
political forces that have driven modern incarceration increases over the 
last three decades. The MPCS revision asserts that the most successful 
modern sentencing jurisdictions, such as Minnesota, have followed the 
theoretical and structural model it endorses; but so too have the least 
successful modern sentencing jurisdictions such as the federal system. 
Problematically, even the success stories within the modern sentencing 
reform movement—the best practices which the MPCS revision avowedly 
embraces and essentially seeks to codify—still reflect the modern tendency 
to shift sentencing power to ex ante rule-makers who are likely to favor 
punitive sentences and are likely to place undue reliance and emphasis on 
quantifiable offense harms and quantifiable punishments like 
incarceration.40 The MPCS revision and its Reporter make much of the fact 
                                                                                                                     
guidelines”); id. § 5H1.4 (providing that drug dependence or alcohol abuse “is not a reason for 
imposing a sentence below the guidelines”). 
 39. See Aaron Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 621–34 (2003) (arguing forcefully against all 
hybrid theories of punishment such as “limiting retributivism”); see also Edward Rubin, Just Say 
No to Retribution, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 17, 50 (2003) (offering the suggestion that, instead of 
“retributive” limits on utilitarianism, the revised Code should speak in terms of “proportionality” 
limits); James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 87–89 (2003) 
(arguing that the revised Code is too retributive); Malcolm Thorburn & Allan Manson, The 
Sentencing Theory Debate: Convergence in Outcomes, Divergence in Reasoning, 10 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 278, 278, 310 (2007) (reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH &  ANDREW ASHWORTH, 
PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING: EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 1–4 (2005) and favoring retributive just 
deserts approach over revised § 1.02). 
 40. This is one reason why, as developed more fully in Part IV, I find it troublesome that the 
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that some states with well-functioning sentencing commissions have had 
comparatively slower rates of prison growth than states without a well-
designed modern sentencing scheme.41 But slower movement in the wrong 
direction is still movement in the wrong direction.  
Against the backdrop of these modern realities, it is useful to look back 
at just how the theoretical “assumptions that have fallen into uncertainty or 
disfavor” in the original MPCS found expression in the particulars of the 
Code. In particular, it is informative to review the ALI’s revised 
commentaries to the original MPCS, which were written in the late 1970s, 
just as structured sentencing reforms were gaining steam.42 Though nearly 
thirty years old, these revised commentaries provide a timeless defense of 
the essential commitments of the original MPCS; they also accurately 
foreshadow many problems now seen in modern structured sentencing 
systems. Because the revised commentaries so effectively highlight the 
enduring and still timely wisdom of the original MPCS, let me quote at 
length their discussion of the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) attitude toward 
imprisonment in general, and toward long prison terms in particular: 
The Code accords a substantial priority to sentences that do 
not involve imprisonment. There is no offense as to which 
imprisonment is absolutely required, except possibly murder. 
It is conceived that even in respect to the most serious crimes 
there may be cases that are so exceptional that some other 
disposition is warranted; and it was feared that one 
consequence of mandatory prison sentences is evasion 
through plea bargaining over the offense charged. When the 
court is deciding between imprisonment and withholding 
imprisonment, it is to choose against imprisonment unless one 
of the specified grounds justifying imprisonment is found. A 
sentence not involving imprisonment avoids the poor 
associations and uselessness that confinement brings; and it 
can convey the community’s confidence that an offender can 
live responsibly and give him a special incentive to do so. If 
the offender is imprisoned, the parole board is directed to 
release him when he is eligible for parole unless one of the 
specified reasons for further confinement is thought to obtain. 
When imprisonment sentences are to be imposed, there are no 
legislatively established minima, except a one year minimum 
for felonies . . . [and] the court generally is without power to 
make certain that an offender will be imprisoned for an 
extraordinarily long time. That consequence is in accord with 
                                                                                                                     
MPCS revision explicitly calls for all jurisdictions to charter a new ex ante sentencing body, a 
sentencing commission, and also to abolish an old ex post sentencing body, the parole board. 
 41. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum xxxi & n.7 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
 42. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES: PART I §§ 6.01 to 7.09, at 2 (1985). 
12
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss4/3
2009] THE ORIGINAL MPC SENTENCING PROVISIONS 721 
 
the Institute’s judgment that such a determination is 
inappropriate at the time of sentencing . . . . [E]xcept for first 
degree felonies, no ordinary offender can be kept in prison 
longer than ten years, less good behavior time . . . [and] with 
every felony sentence there will be considerable latitude for 
the parole board to decide upon release before expiration of 
the maximum.43 
With all due respect to the MPCS revision, these statements cause me to 
cheer more than any aspect of the new sentencing provisions. In particular, 
the original MPCS’ bold and forceful commitment to imprisonment as a 
last resort and least-preferred reality, both at the time of sentencing and at 
all times thereafter, is a refreshing and needed perspective in an era of mass 
incarceration and extreme punishment terms. A fitting sense of 
inprisonment’s horrible human realities, not to mention its inefficacies, is 
palpable in the original MPCS. In the MPCS revision, sentencing and 
inprisonment has the feel of a technical government challenge, rather than 
a necessary evil within a society committed to human liberty and personal 
freedoms. 
I do not mean to assert that the “cure” of modern sentencing reforms is 
categorically worse than the diseases of older sentencing systems. But I do 
mean to encourage reflection on the real possibility that, despite the very 
best of intentions, the theoretical underpinnings, legal structures, social 
policies, and political rhetoric of modern sentencing reforms have 
contributed to the growth in prison populations and the extreme liberty 
deprivations that have now become so common in American criminal 
justice systems. More directly, I think the ALI should embark upon a 
focused and progressive attack on modern incarceration realities. In my 
view, the ALI should again advocate a fundamental and forceful 
commitment to the concept of imprisonment as a last resort for offenders 
and a least-preferred response to criminal justice problems. 
IV.   AS A MATTER OF STRUCTURE, THE MPCS REVISION SHOULD NOT 
GIVE UP ON PAROLE BOARDS 
In addition to advocating a new (and I fear problematic) theoretical 
foundation for “model” sentencing systems, the MPCS revision also 
embraces and promotes a significant change in the institutional actors 
involved in sentencing decision-making. Specifically, the “central 
institutional recommendation of the revised MPC is that every jurisdiction 
should charter a permanent sentencing commission, or equivalent agency, 
to perform the basic research and prescriptive functions”44 involved in the 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 8–9. 
 44. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Note to Article 6A, at 45 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
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development and evolution of a presumptive guideline system. In addition, 
by virtue of its call for the abolition of traditional parole, the MPCS 
revision functionally advocates the elimination of parole boards as an 
institutional player in the sentencing universe.45 Though the motivation and 
apparent wisdom for these structural suggestions are easy to understand 
given the MPCS revision’s sentencing theories and basic goals, the MPCS 
seems too optimistic about the ability of sentencing commissions to 
improve sentencing policies and practices, and too pessimistic about the 
inability of parole boards to sentencing policies and practices. 
Notwithstanding the MPCS revision’s pessimistic view of parole 
boards, I accept and endorse the revision’s fundamental belief that a well-
functioning sentencing commission can have a positive impact on 
sentencing policies and practices in any jurisdiction. Because so many 
aspects of sentencing law, policy, and practice are complicated, contested, 
dynamic, and divisive, every jurisdiction can and should benefit from a 
specialized and dedicated agency that is well-funded, well-staffed, and 
well-positioned to monitor, assess, analyze, and report on system-wide and 
case-specific sentencing issues and problems. Especially now that 
administrative agencies have become a fundamental part of the structure of 
government at the state level, it is difficult to make a serious argument 
against the simple idea that a specialized sentencing agency should be part 
of every jurisdiction’s criminal justice infrastructure. There can be much 
reflection and debate over the ideal forms and functions of modern 
sentencing commissions,46 but the MPCS revision advocates a commission 
framework that seems as likely to be successful as any other basic model 
(especially since jurisdictions can and will create commissions tailored to 
local needs and customs). 
While it is difficult to make a convincing argument against the basic 
suggestion that jurisdictions charter some kind of permanent sentencing 
commission or equivalent agency, it is also difficult to make a convincing 
argument that modern sentencing commissions ensure that jurisdictions 
only embrace and enact just and effective sentencing laws and policies. 
Though the MPCS revision rightly documents all the good that sentencing 
commissions are able to do, it does not directly confront the critical reality 
that sentencing commissions have never proven especially effective at 
decreasing incarceration rates even when jurisdictions clearly no longer 
need and can no longer afford increased prison populations. Modern 
sentencing history suggests that, at best, commissions can sometimes 
defuse the punitive tendencies of other sentencing actors and thereby help 
slow prison growth; at worst, commissions can sometimes support the 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING, Reporter’s Introductory Memorandum 1–31 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). Kevin R. Reitz, Reporter’s Memorandum, in MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING, Reporter’s Study 1–31 (Council Draft No. 2, Sept. 12, 2008). 
 46. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT, Reporter’s Introduction 4 (2003). 
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punitive tendencies of other sentencing actors and thereby further increase 
incarceration rates.47 
I believe the relative failings of sentencing commissions in this regard 
is fundamentally a problem of institutional design. Even when constructed 
in a “model” form, sentencing commissions will rarely possess the 
effective legal tools or political power or the best institutional perspective 
to reverse the distressing prison growth trends and extreme punishments 
documented in Part I. Even the best commissions can really only provide 
sentencing advice—principally system-wide policy advice to legislatures 
concerning sentencing laws and case-specific guideline recommendations 
to judges about sentencing outcomes (though perhaps also to prosecutors 
and defense counsel). But actual sentencing decision-makers can and 
frequently will want to ignore even the wisest advice from sentencing 
commissions, whether because political calculations or gut instincts 
suggest this advice may not be efficacious. Moreover, the advice given by 
sentencing commissions must often compete for attention with contrary 
advice and countervailing pressures that actual sentencing decision-makers 
receive from various other sentencing advocates. 
These problematic institutional and practical dynamics limiting the 
positive impact of commission efforts, especially with respect to system-
wide policy-making, have been especially prominent in the federal 
sentencing system. Often at the urging of prosecutors, Congress has 
repeatedly ignored or disregarded the advice of the United States 
Sentencing Commission concerning the harms and injustices of statutory 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions48 and the unjustified and 
disparate impact of sentencing distinctions between crack and powder 
cocaine.49 Similarly at the state level, experience has repeatedly shown that 
when legislatures or judges get caught up in a wave of political and public 
excitement about certain types of crimes or criminals—such as the “three 
strikes” mania from a decade ago or the sex offender panic currently 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The 
Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973 
(2006); Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715 (2005). 
 48. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal 
Criminal Justice System (1991); see also Julie Stewart, The Effects of Mandatory Minimums on 
Families and Society, 16 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 37 (1999) (noting that “in 1991, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission issued a very important report on mandatory minimums, which was basically ignored 
once it was published, even though it was well done”). 
 49. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal 
Sentencing Policy (2002); U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine 
and Federal Sentencing Policy (1997); U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the 
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1995); see also Steven L. Chanenson, Booker 
on Crack: Sentencing’s Latest Gordian Knot, 15 CORNELL J. L. &  PUB. POL’Y 551 (2006) (detailing 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s repeated efforts to reform crack sentences and Congress’s 
rejection of the Commission’s initial reforms and its repeated disinterest in responding to the 
Commission’s recommendation). 
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afoot—sentencing commissions are rarely able (and sometimes not even 
willing) to wage an effective fight against the political forces and public 
pressures calling for even harsher sentencing laws.50 
One can hope that the new commissions advocated by the MPCS 
revision will be more effective than old commissions at keeping in check 
all the political and social forces leading to modern mass incarceration. I 
am not particularly optimistic, especially since there is little reason to 
expect that the model sentencing commission devised by the MPCS 
revision will have unique new institutional powers or will be able to alter 
modern political sentencing pressures. Moreover, as suggested by the 
stunning statistics set forth in Part I, it is now no longer sufficient to 
propose models that we simply hope can help halt increases in 
imprisonment rates and extreme prison terms. At this juncture, it is 
critically important that American jurisdictions start reversing prison 
growth and reducing incarceration rates; however, there is little reason to 
expect sentencing commissions will or even can be an effective 
institutional actor for this critical mission. 
Against this backdrop, the positive modern potential of parole boards 
starts to come into focus. Parole boards generally have one central mission, 
namely to decide when society is better served by allowing an offender to 
serve the rest of his sentence outside, rather than inside, prison walls. As 
back-end, ex post offender-oriented institutions, parole boards possess both 
the effective legal tools and an ideal institutional perspective to reduce 
incarceration rates and mitigate extreme punishments. 
Of course, the modern history of parole board functioning is anything 
but inspiring, in part because parole officials have often been subject to the 
political pressures and other social and legal forces that have fueled the 
punitive turn in other aspects of modern sentencing systems. Nevertheless, 
the realities of modern mass incarceration—combined with my view that 
we are long overdue to show a renewed respect for our nation’s historic 
commitment to protecting individual liberty and limiting government 
power in the criminal justice system51—lead me to the conclusion that we 
                                                                                                                     
 50. See Wright, supra note 34, at 429 (detailing failure of sentencing commissions to impact 
three-strike sentencing reforms pursued by state legislatures); se  also Ohio Criminal Sentencing 
Commission, Interim Report on Rape Penalties 2 (Oct. 2006) (noting that a single well-publicized 
case led the Ohio General Assembly to quickly consider and approve bills without Commission 
input); Chris Megerian & Mary Fuchs, NJ Maintains its Strict Drug Sentences Despite Changes 
Elsewhere, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 31, 2009 (noting political forces that have prevented drug 
sentencing reforms despite forceful reform advocacy from the New Jersey Commission to Review 
Criminal Sentencing). 
 51. See generally Douglas A. Berman, Reorienting Progressive Perspectives for Twenty-First 
Century Punishment Realities, 3 HARV. L. &  POL’Y REV. (Online) (Dec. 8, 2008) (arguing that 
many Founding Era principles are undermined by mass incarceration and the huge growth of 
government structures devoted to criminal justice administration and suggesting that a “serious 
commitment to originalist views on human liberty and personal freedoms and to our nation’s core 
founding principles should lead many more modern constitutional scholars to spotlight and 
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should now focus on improving the functioning of parole boards, rather 
than just deciding to throw out the parole baby with the sentencing reform 
bath-water. 
I have recently written an article addressing why, and how, modern 
sentencing commissions can and should play an active role in combating 
mass incarceration and extreme prison terms,52 and my comments here 
should not be read as a condemnation of the positive potential of effective 
sentencing commissions. Still, in light of modern crime and punishment 
realities, with crime rates generally on the decline and modern 
incarceration rates historically high, it is critical now to take an “all hands 
on deck” approach to the problems of mass incarceration and extreme 
prison terms. Though I hope modern sentencing commissions proposed by 
the MPCS will be committed to addressing the harms of mass 
incarceration, I also believe that modern parole boards could, and should, 
play an important institutional role in a truly “model” modern sentencing 
system. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Modern sentencing and punishment realities frame and define my basic 
reaction to the MPCS revision. In my view, the fact that the United States 
has become the world’s leader in incarceration and other extreme 
punishments is not merely a serious problem, but a national disgrace and 
embarrassment. Because the MPCS revision fails to address directly what 
is really broken in modern American sentencing and punishment systems, 
it represents a missed opportunity for the ALI to be a positive and 
progressive voice in the modern criminal justice arena. The ALI should 
directly assail and seek to remedy modern injustices that have come to 
define modern sentencing attitudes and practices. 
                                                                                                                     
rigorously question America’s modern incarceration explosion”), available at 
http://www.hlpronline.com/Berman_HLPR_120808.pdf. 
 52. See Douglas A. Berman, Exploring the Theory, Policy and Practice of Fixing Broken 
Sentencing Guidelines, 21 FED. SENT’G REP.182–85 (2009). 
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